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Abstract
Seniority  runs  deep.  As  the  saying  goes  for  some  conventions  or  institutions  in  some
societies,  seniority  exhibits  and  engulfs  into  almost  all  nooks  and  corners  of  their
organisations. This paper presents an analysis of the conflict between two groups in the run-
up to seniority in these institutions. We overview the inspirations and practice of each group,
and their conflict in the run-up to organisational seniority, and analyse the conflict using a
simple model  of a “Deviants’ Dilemma” game played in a single population. Within the
game’s  framework,  we  analyse  the  conditions  for  the  evolutionary stable  state  and  the
stability of the proportions of each group, given a strategy resulting from learning based on
rewards.  We also provide a short  discussion on the role of noise  in  the system and we
conclude with some discussions on the generality and possible applications of the model. 
A version of this paper was presented at the 8th Annual Workshop on Economics With Heterogeneous
Interacting Agents “WEHIA 2003”,  May 29-31, Kiel, Germany 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Quite sometimes in life, things do not work nicely in the favour of certain groups. Also
sometimes if you’re the loser, in spite of your patience, persistence and perseverance, you’re
still  stuck  with  the  outcome.  Consider  the  cases  of  appointments  to  high  positions  or
promotion exercises in some societies. There are things that first require cooperation from
both  parties,  the  promoting  and the  promoted.  Let  us  consider  an  academic  set-up,  and
continue to do so for the purposes of this paper. First on the eventual winner, he begins by
projecting himself as the leader in his academic field in his institution so he stands a very
good chance of being selected to head, say, a high profile research committee managing
substantial amounts of funds. Or suppose that you have long aspired to be appointed as a
professor  in  your university.  You follow standard  procedures,  fill  in  all  required  forms,
present your curriculum vitae highlighting the numbers, and presumably mask any academic
benchmarks higher than the one that you use, and then enter yourself for promotion, which is
to be decided by a panel committee whose members do not know you nor understand your
field of specialization that well. Once your employer makes such a commitment and you get
appointed, you start playing the pseudo’s game after enjoying the perks and privileges of the
job.  The  university,  the  loser,  is  stuck  –  with  a  large  salary obligation  and  you  merci
beaucoup, will be laughing all the way to the bank! These are just two of the many prevalent
examples. 
The university’s headache may essentially be in the form of a one-shot game. Would the
university’s  panel  appoint  you to  the  post  unless  they believe  and understand that  your
professional experience and qualifications are commensurate with the appointment? This is
one of the so-called "commitment dilemmas" of the university1. Once you have played the
game  nicely and  convinced  the  interview  panel  (and  the  university  top  management  is
convinced) that you truly deserved to be appointed to the professorial post, this is where the
fun steps in (for you of course!); you will then have many opportunities when it will be to
your advantage to (academically) “cheat” on the trusted appointment. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we provide an overview
of the aspirations and practice of  deviants and  pseudos, two groups in a single population
who upon instruction, encounter into a conflict. In Section 3, we formalize the encounter in a
1 This so called “commitment dilemmas” was described beautifully by Robert Frank of Cornell University in
[Frank, 1989].
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simple evolutionary game model - we present the Deviants’ Dilemma (DD) game. Within
the framework of the assumed payoffs, we analyse the conditions for the evolutionary stable
state and the stability of the proportions of each group. Section 4 extends the analysis briefly
by considering the role of noise. In section 5, we conclude with some discussions on the
possible applications of the model. 
2. THE PLAYERS
Suppose that there may have been attempts in implementing some prerequisites in the quest
for  excellence  in  academic  institutions.  These  “overnight”  efforts  may be  sincere  in  the
context of intentions and objectives. Academic meritocracy finally may soon be stamping its
mark  in  campus  promotions.  But  the  problem  is  establishments  do  not  come  and  go
overnight and actual practices may not turn in favour towards those who persevere to meet
international standards2. 
Consider the first group, pseudos, who strive to be deemed individuals of great merit, but are
hardly arguably so. Once they are in the driver’s seat, for any act of them continuing to play
the pseudo’s game, it is the system of the day which dictates as to whether they are safe or
not. Most or all of the time pseudos will never be penalized for definitions of quality can be
somewhat tuned to be relative3. 
Suppose  then  there  is  another  group  in  the  institution,  a  so-called  deviant group  who
willingly impose the international benchmark upon them. Deviants claim there are lot of
pseudos who “cheat” and prosper, rising their way up the academic ladder. They argue that
it’s common sight in campuses to have seniors flagging their seniority and asking juniors to
get on academically but what juniors receive from seniors in return for all the high regards
and respect instead are repeated displays and signals for the former to emulate the latter’s
2 Deviants claim there may have been many allegations of heterogeneous criteria being applied to different
candidates with respect to publications in promotion exercises. This may in some probability be due to existing
non-objective benchmarks in the promotion system. 
3 An example of the deviants argument on the relativity of quality: Suppose all academic staff members in
Bagus University applying for PhD research study leave in the UK are required to gain admission into “5”
ranked tertiary institutions as one of the conditions for the eligibility of their scholarship award. Following
which, by consistency rules, Bagus University will also have to adapt the objective criteria utilised by the UK’s
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) panel to arrive at their respective rankings of each institution into their
merit system. A simple example of which is the list and the ranking of journals publications used by the RAE
panel.
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trade. The pseudos’ sermon is “one has to play by the  you can’t change the system rules,
project yourself and work your way to be appointed in at least some administrative posts
these are the so called power speaks stuff, look smart, look busy, commit yourself to attend
lots and lots of meetings, and publish lots and lots of papers as opposed to a few deep ones”4.
Deviants insist on the transparency and fairness of the promotion system and productivity
and quality to be defined according to an objective benchmark5. The Deviants’ conjecture is
that cultural and traditional norms are still encapsulating their academic environment hence
research and papers emancipating from research are all regarded as of the same quality -
numbers,  and pages will  impress and will  count  heavily. Deviants  say pseudos’  confuse
assessors  with  both rewarded and un-rewarded activities,  and dummy their  way through
promotion and never  seem to be bothered less caught. They claim there are many pseudo
academicians  who are quite expert  at  the above game,  and their  impression of pseudos’
summarised  by  Gerard  Silverberg’s  “constantly  hashing  and  rehashing  the  same
fundamental material in lieu of genuinely new results”. 
Next, the story continues with sudden changes in the university’s top management personnel.
This  new  management  started  implementing  new  standards  with  regards  to  promotion.
Following  exposure  and  studies  on  “actual”  international  standards,  supposedly,  the
institution’s  top  management  begin  to  recognise  international  benchmarks  and  start
amending  promotion  regulations.  Consider  a  new  institutional  ruling  passed  such  that
academicians do have to work in pairs, and output of this supposedly cooperation will be
assessed  and  submitted  to  institutional  authorities  for  annual  evaluation  and  promotion
considerations.  Intra institution  wise,  academicians  are  required  to  pair  up,  cooperate  in
research, and apply for annual promotion to be decided by the institution’s panel. 
We  now bring the  above encounter  and  conflict  of  pseudos  and  deviants  into  analysis.
Assume that neither deviant nor pseudo can tell whether a chosen working partner belongs to
which group.  What  will  then be  the  proportion  of  future  academia?  Furthermore,  if  the
4 What’s the issue here? It’s some of the Deviants Inspirations: Hal Varian of UC Berkeley (in  The AEA’s
Electronic Publishing Plans: A Progress Report) suggested “universities adopt a policy of putting a limit on the
number of papers they will accept for purposes of tenure review” (i.e. in the promotion exercise of an assistant
professor to that of an associate). He stressed that “authors can focus themselves on doing a few serious pieces
rather lots of shallow ones”, and quoted Herb Simon’s “wealth of information creates a poverty of attention”.
What deviants say in context of Hal Varian’s suggestion to their experience is that “we have truckloads of cases
of wealth of information creating wealth of admiration!” 
5 The conflict arising between deviant and pseudo is because the former plays to the tune of the international
benchmark, while the latter endeavours to uphold existing academic norms and standards – repertoire of
traditional institutional practices.
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pseudo’s practice is such an attractive strategy, why don’t all deviants dump the international
benchmark and conform to the pseudo game? This is the evolutionary problem for deviants.
Once a deviant chooses to cooperate, and mistakenly ends up with a pseudo partner, in the
reality of his operating environment, he’ll be stuck with the outcome, too bad for him then.
Will pseudos be soon taking over these institutions? Will future academia be full of pseudos?
Will pseudomania be running rampage in campus? We proceed to describe a simple model
to answer some of these questions in the next section.
3. THE MODEL 
Consider the choice of deviant and pseudo being represented by a “Deviants’  Dilemma”
(DD) game, assuming two-person interactions as the basis for academic cooperation. Say a
deviant  gets  payoff  of  c when  paired  with  a  deviant,  but  0  when  stuck  with  a  pseudo
(deviants just cannot work with pseudos — they just turn disequilibrated and get nothing!).
However, pseudos just love to pair up with deviants and gets b (b>c) when he goes with a
deviant. Of course pseudomania is unoriginal, they just would not want to work hard enough
to generate new material, and hence they try to avoid one another, but if stuck each will get
only  a (a<c).  This  is  represented  by the following symmetric  ‘fixed  zero  baseline’  22
payoff matrix:
                    B
A
                  Pseudo                    Deviant
Pseudo
                          a
a
                             0
b
Deviant
                          b
0
                             c
c
with the requirement that bca 0 . Discounting a scaling factor, there are actually only
two  free  parameters  which  define  the  system,  which  we  represent  as    and   ,  where
b
a =  and 
c
a = . Thus the requirement that cb   translates as   .
Due to the choice of this payoff set-up, if there is no way that deviants can recognise pseudo,
then the latter are going to predominate the academic population big time. Pseudos will then
always  do  better,  regardless  of  their  proportion  in  academia.  This  is  illustrated  by  the
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following one-shot analysis. Let’s say the proportion of deviants in the university population
is p, so that that of pseudos would be pp = )1( . Then assuming that the players exercise
rational  choice  based  on  the  allocated  payoffs,  the  expected  number  of  pseudos  would
always be greater than deviant for any value of p, since the average payoff for deviants is
(1 )0pc p pc  =
while that for pseudos is
(1 )bp p a  .
One finds that payoffs for pseudos are always higher, 
(1 )bp p a pc   .
This is because    and 
(1 ) 0p
p

 , yielding
(1 )p
p
 

    or  (1 )p p p    ,
which leads to the inequality. Therefore in general, without the availability of information on
potential  partners,  if  we assume that  proportion of the university’s next  set  of incoming
academician conforming themselves to either becoming a pseudo or deviant is based on the
average score, pseudos tend to dominate for all values of p in this DD game. 
Consider the case where information is involved in the system. Suppose a deviant can only
identify a partner is a deviant or a pseudo by looking into the person’s  curriculum vitae.6
Assume there’s some cost to this effort. Let’s say it costs them r or a on average. Then a
deviant can guarantee oneself a payoff of  c-r points by ensuring he pairs up with another
deviant. To be exact, the probability of finding a deviant after finding (n-1) pseudos is given
by,
1 1Pr( ) (1 ) (1 )n nn p p p p =  = 
giving the average number of verifications required before a deviant is found, to be
1
1 1
Pr( ) (1 )
k k
n
n n
n n n p np 
= =
= = å å  .
where  k is the number of available partnerships. However for simplicity we assume 1 is
exactly the total  cost; besides, for small values of  p  (i.e.  large proportions of deviants),
1=n  is  a  good approximation.  If every deviant  conducts  this  check  before starting the
cooperation, then pseudos would only have themselves to work with and get  a, if so then
6 More  of  deviants  inspirations:  They  claim it  may be  common  practice  to  see  the  majority  of  tertiary
institutions both public and private highlighting and marketing their academic programmes but what is glaringly
missing is for the public to view the academicians curriculum vitae (It seems that most academicians keep their
objective curriculum vitae confidential except to the promotions panel for reasons they alone know best).
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deviant  would  soon  take  over  the  institutions  and  soon  all  universities  will  be  full  of
deviants! The implicit point here is the finiteness of the system, where pseudos get a through
exclusion, where otherwise they would get the highest payoff of b by also checking on their
partners. 
So what is the proportion q of deviants who will be paying the cost of checking on average?
We have to find that value q that gives pseudos the same payoff on average as deviants. For
the  iterated  game,  assuming  some  kind  of  learning,  the  evolutionary stable  state (ESS)
equilibrium requirement is that the average payoff for deviant  is  the same, whether they
check the identity of their working partner and pay the verification cost, or simply just take
their chances in their choice of academic pairing:
c-r = cp + (1-p)0
giving


== 11
c
rp  ≡ p*
at equilibrium. Here players chose to be deviants or pseudos iteratively, with the choices
dependent on what they have learnt from previous play.7 Notice also, the game is actually
extended to include the choice of verification or non-verification. Learning assumes that the
average  scores  obtained  by  deviants  and  by  pseudos  in  previous  rounds  are  common
knowledge.  Alternatively,  a  local  iterative  learning  scheme,  where  for  example  each
individual keeps a cumulative score of the different choices obtained by one-self in previous
rounds, can be envisaged. This can be e.g. in the form of winner-take-all neural networks
[von der Malsburg, 1973].
When dealing with that proportion of the deviant that is not checking things out,(1 )q , a
pseudo can expect a payoff of [pb+(1-p)a]. But, when dealing with those that do check it out,
pseudos will sadly have to revert to work with their own kind and just get a. So on average,
the proportion of deviants who conduct the “check-out your partner” is given by: 
(1-q)[pb + (1-p)a] + aq = c-r
Dividing by a and rearranging;





 =











 qq 1)1(
and we can then finally arrive at
7 The system dynamics can be of two forms: (i) as new players enter the system, they decide once and for all to
be  either  deviants  or  pseudos  (ii)  the  system  size  remains  constant  while  its  members  decide  on  the
deviant/pseudo choice at every timestep, allowing continued changes of individual states. For the purposes of of
this paper, we assume that these two dynamics do not bring significant differences.
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1
)(


=

q  ≡ q*
where












=




 1 .
So in equilibrium, an average of  q*of deviants will  be paying verification costs (or all of
them may be doing it q*of the time). If q > q*, then deviants’ population would rise above p*,
which as illustrated in Fig. 1, is unstable. And if q < q*, similarly, the population of deviants
would start to fall, which is also unstable. In Fig. 1, q = q*at equilibrium is the point where
the  deviant’s  payoff crosses the  pseudo’s payoff on the vertical  line  segment between a
payoff of pb and a, i.e. at the payoff of c-r. This point of crossing is q*of the way down that
c-r unit segment, less than the payoff of [pb + (1-p)a] (when 0q = ) or 1- q* of the way up
from the payoff of  a (when  q = 1). This point of  p =  p* and  q =  q* stands as a point of
stability or an attractor.
The value  is like the weighted (by the ratio of information or verification cost to deviant-
deviant payoff, /) average of  with 1. As  changes from 0 to ,  changes proportionally
from  to 1. The value for q would then change from ( -)/( -1) to infinity. 
 
The pay-offs to each side is again illustrated in Figure 1. If p < p*, then the right hand side of
the deviants’ pay-off equation would be less than c-r, and so every deviant would learn that
it  will  be much better  to  pay the check-out  cost,  identify their  academic partner  and be
guaranteed c-r. This would then start to reduce the population of pseudos, so that  p would
start  to  rise.  If  p >  p*,  on  the  other  hand,  deviants  would  learn  to  stop  checking,  and
[sometimes] even to turn pseudos, and the population of pseudos would increase so that  p
begins to decline. In either case, the population would return to its stable state where p = p*. 
The rates of return are typified by the differences  in the respective payoffs in the following
Figure 1.
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     b
             Payoff to pseudo
                                                                                                      
     c
Payoffs Payoff to deviant
     c-r
                                                      
    a
     
      0      p*      1
Proportion of deviants p
Figure 1: Payoffs for different deviant proportions in the DD game with information
From Figure 1, for  p <  p*,  deviants get average payoffs of  c-r,  because they all  pay the
verification costs, and for p > p*, deviants are paid off as cp+(1-p)0, which will increase from
c-r to c as p increases from p* to 1. For pseudos, to the left of p = p*, the average payoff is a,
since they will be working only with their own kind, but to the right, they are paid off as bp+
(1-p)a, which increases from [pb+(1-p)a] to b as p increases from p* to 1. To the right of p =
p*, the payoffs to pseudos are greater than that to deviants, so the latter’s proportion (p) will
decrease, and conversely to the left of this point, resulting in the stable point p = p*.8 
The evolutionary dynamics of the system can thus be represented by the following attractor
diagram9:
8 What’s about this  p =  p*? If the costs of verification were higher, or if the payoff from deviant working
together is lower, then p would be much lower. But we’ll follow the deviants’ inspiration in this case - How can
the payoff for deviants in working together be low? Deviants just perform when they work with their own kind!
Evidennement!
9 Notice that the population of pseudos in the institution can vary erratically as soon as too few or too many
deviants are opting for the check-out. In equilibrium every deviant is indifferent to choosing either to cooperate
or not to cooperate, because they get the same average score for the two cases. However, the choice taken
makes a big difference to pseudos! 
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                                     p*
                                       P
Figure 2:  Attractor diagram for the DD game with information
4. ROLE OF NOISE
Consider introducing noise into the system. In reality, noise is actually required for optimal
learning,  especially  when  local  learning  is  implemented.   At  the  early  stages,  some
randomness  of  choice  (despite  initial  neural  network  responses)  are  required  to  prevent
players from becoming immediately stuck to their initial choices and thus not allowing the
search for the equilibrium values. In other words, the system needs to “thermalize” in order
to reach equilibrium.
Noise  in  this  system would  come from errors  or  uncertainties  in  payoffs,  as  well  as  in
information relating to the research partner checking-out process. Let us first look at the
effect of noise on the dominance of pseudos in the DD game as well as on the attractor
values of p and q in the DD game, firstly with no information and then with information. 
With no information,  from generalized payoffs we have the pseudo group dominating as
long as  
(1 ) 0p
p
 

   . However, at substantial levels of noise, there would be a non-
trivial chance that deviants instead would prosper. If we assume the noise in payoffs to be
Gaussian  and  quantified  by its  (normalized  by  a2)  variance  2,  then  the  probability  for
deviants dominating, which equals p, is given by the cumulative error function:
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










 
=
2/
)1(
erfc
2
1


p
p
p
where the factor 2 in the argument comes from the quadratic sum of errors in and. 
For the system with information on prospective partners available through verification, noise
in payoffs  is  expected to  smear the  equilibrium values of  p and  q correspondingly, and
similar analyses as above could be carried out. What is more relevant here is noise in the
information obtained, viz. there is some probability s that the type (deviant or pseudo) of the
prospective partner is not really according to the information obtained in the verification
process. The average payoff to the deviant after checking is now (1-s)c (where we have not
included errors in payoffs). The ESS now requires that
0)1()1( pcprcs =
giving an equilibrium value of 


== s
c
rsp 11 .
Similarly, the equilibrium value of q is now given by
rcsaqappbq = )1(0])1()[1(
which gives
1
])1[(


=

 sq  
where


















=




 ss1 .
The noise has caused the proportion of deviants to drop, and has also changed the proportion
of verifiers.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have  described and outlined a  simple  model  of  an  evolutionary game analysing the
dilemma of deviants in their conflict with pseudos in the run-up to seniority in some tertiary
institutions. The history of deviants and pseudos can also be painted differently bringing a
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different picture to the set-up to the conflict in the game, payoffs and strategies. Supposedly
if  in the payoffs we have made  pseudo to be equally good at  choosing deviant  as their
partners  as  deviant  themselves  are  in  picking  their  own,  pseudo will  then  have  the
evolutionary  advantage  instead.  We  have  also  illustrated  the  conduct  of  the  associated
stability analysis of each group. 
To this end we have presented the formal Deviants’ Dilemma game. Possibly, the novelty of
the game is its one-sidedness, while information coupled with exclusiveness then is seen to
overcome the  one-sidedness.  The  outcome  of  our  deviants’  dilemma  game parallels  the
findings  of  Kim  and  Parker  (1995)  -  the  initial  advantage  points  to  traditional  pseudo
academic group-the payoff matrix  blatantly favours them, but when information is  made
available  (albeit  at  cost),  exclusiveness  of  partner-choosing  then  pushes  out  this  group
despite being favoured.
Throughout, the discussion has centred around an academic set-up. Nevertheless, we feel
that similar conflicts can be identified in other organisations. We envisage applications to
networking  of  businesses,  run-up  to  seniority  in  business  corporations,  and  in  political
organizations. It is also in our interests to explore in future the role that DD might play in the
emergence  of  heterogeneity  in  agent-based  models  of  the  economy.  .  We  hope  to  run
extensive computer simulations of the model to verify the analysis done in this paper, and to
report the results in a future publication.
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